How Technológos "Responds" to What Used to Be Called "Images": A Media-Archaeological Response to the "Questionnaire on the Changing Ontology of the Image" by Ernst, Wolfgang
84
LIBERATING THE IMAGE FROM ITS
ANTHROPOCENTRIC DEFINITION
“Traditionally we think of images as [...] delimited phenomena 
that in one way or the other appear to the human mind and 
apparatus of perception” (Questionnaire). The choice of words in 
the Questionnaire is indicative already. When optical physiology 
and cognitive image sensation—from the “analogue” camera 
obscura-like eye to the almost “digital” signal-computing brain—
is observed closely,1 image processing within the human turns 
out as, indeed, a function of an “apparatus.” Sigmund Freud’s 
nonmetaphorical concept of the psychic “Apparat” in chapter VII of 
his Interpretation of Dreams2 explicitly compares the preliminary 
stages of imaging to the microscope, or to photography.3 The 
mechanistic approach reemerged in protocybernetic research 
into the electrical circuit simulation of neural image perception.4 
The human “mind and apparatus of perception” (Questionnaire) 
literally became a nonhuman machinery in Rosenblatt’s 
computational Perceptron, liberating the “image” from its 
physiological anthropocentrism.5
Machine vision, so far, stayed profoundly different from 
human image cognition. But technical images as outputs from 
Artificial Neuronal Nets start to challenge, and to emulate, the 
human imaginative potential, once they are not only trained by 
human tagging, but (in a more complex way) by rivalling machines 
among themselves which are fed with big data derived from “social 
media.” Just like Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, in his 1766 treatise 
Laokoon, had almost identified the aesthetic properties of the 
visual arts as parallel perception (aisthesis, in the Aristotelean 
sense) of coexistent units in space, today, it is no coincidence 
that “deep” machine learning takes place in parallel graphics 
processing units (GPUs) that were originally developed for image 
processing in computers. Artificial Intelligence does not simply 
mimick human image perception (even if Van Gogh-like paintings 
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produced by AI are gimmicks, according to contemporary 
discourse), but more profoundly, it challenges the narcissistic view 
that humans are the only beings able to develop a semantic sense 
of imagery. The outputs of Artificial Neural Nets (such as the Self-
Organizing Maps), which are predominantly images, remind the 
human of the technicity of his, or her, image perception itself.
THE “NETWORKED IMAGE”: TEXTUALITY, LITERALLY
The current “intensification of what we might call the networked-
ness of the image” (Questionnaire), from a media-archaeological 
point of view, is an externalization of the inherently “textile” 
essence of technical image production.6 The technical image 
within media-archaeologies has already been networked from 
within, both materially and logically: as a tissue, which became 
techno-logical in Jacquard’s programmable loom. The general 
theme of the Dutch Electronic Art Festival in Rotterdam in 
February–March 2003, “Data Knitting,”7 reminded of this first 
proto-digital “image” production in France around 1800, which 
soon afterwards provided the model for data processing in 
Charles Babbage’s design of a first programmable computer.
RE-ALPHABETIZING THE “IMAGE”: PIXEL ANALYSIS
A mathematical, computationally defined image is an arbitrary 
and physically improbable (therefore negentropic) configuration 
of picture elements. The pixel as the smallest conceivable digital 
picture element makes sense in an iconic way only when appearing 
within a group. Digitizing images is technologocentric. “I want 
to take control over every pixel,” media artist Andreas Menn 
once expressed in his experimental film about digital images 
titled Workout.8 From here, new options for searching with(in) 
engines emerge: visual search with precise targeting down to 
each pixel in an image. Such an analysis can be set in motion by 
a sorting algorithm, which step by step deconstructs the image’s 
iconological meaning by rearranging the pixels according to 
color similarity values. The Searching Images project website 
expressed this by an enduring flash animation.9
It is not the high resolution of an image that is crucial for 
its digitized reproduction (or rather: transformation), but its 
addressability at every discrete pixel element. This is a non-
social approach, since it ignores the discursive implications of, 
for example, the painter’s intention. With digitization, what has 
belonged to the Humanities so far, becomes algorithmically 
“inhuman.” Electronic face recognition identifies schemes, not 
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individuals. Once translated into computable numbers, the 
memory of art from the cultural past invites for algorithmic 
analysis, such as pattern recognition (aka “style”), in amounts 
previously unattainable for a single scholar.
MACHINE VISION, AND ITS COLD (MEDIA-)
ARCHAEOLOGICAL GAZE
In its escalation from passive “analogue” telecommunication 
to algorithmicized “digital” intelligence (in all senses), the 
age of electronic signal transmission, storage, and processing, 
has resulted in “a proliferation of machine imagery that 
operates independently of human perception and cognition” 
(Questionnaire) indeed. What cultural aesthetics used to call 
“image” so far, radically transforms into a techno-mathematical 
image function. Such technically operative (rather than bodily 
performative) images have become “images without a social goal” 
(Questionnaire). They relate to the “cold media-archaeological 
gaze” instead.
The cold camera-eye gaze of televisonary media relates to 
media-archaeological aesthetics. Friedrich Nietzsche’s “pathetic 
distance” in philosophical analysis insists on the exteriority 
of analysis, as opposed to hermeneutic empathy. Even more 
rigorously, this corresponds with Ernst Jünger’s aesthetics 
of detachment as a mode of perception created by optical 
technology.10 The image searching software of the company 
Cobion in Kassel, Germany, for example, once crawled the Web 
for pornographic child abuse images—this task could have 
been painful for humans, but not for the machine.11 The media-
archaeological gaze is cold in McLuhan’s sense of differentiating 
between “hot” and “cold” media—with the latter ones inviting a 
human receiver to participate actively when putting visual signal 
streams into relation(s). When media themselves become active 
archaeologists of data, the cold gaze of the machine is no longer 
an empathetic vision but an optical element in cybernetic feedback 
systems.
Does it make sense at all for media theory to metonymically 
apply the category of the human gaze to machine vision? Dziga 
Vertov, in his film The Man with the Camera, makes the camera-
eye (the KinoGlaz) an agent of vision. In Alfred Hitchcock’s film 
The Birds, at one point, the camera switches to the birds-eye 
perspective from above, making the whole scene look completely 
different. But the overall perspective in this film is, technically, 
that of the camera “eye” which is still an analogy to human panoptic 
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perception. In techno-mathematical systems, however, the notion 
of seeing itself becomes metaphorical. In their processing of 
optical inputs as data, signals are radically abstracted. In such 
technologies, ‘command,’ ‘control,’ ‘communications,’ and 
‘intelligence’ converge. Cruise Missiles are guided by mapping 
prerecorded visual coordinates with what is actually perceived, 
like in GPS for navigation, where topological data, rather than 
images, are communicated. Such operative images are hardly even 
“images” any more.
Media-archaeological “vision” in fact corresponds with the 
aesthetics of technical image reading. The scanning beam itself 
is an actual archaeologist here, as in the case of detection of 
underwater traces of ancient monuments. The search for the wrack 
of the ocean liner Titanic has been a true instantiation of such a 
submarine archaeology. While the gaze of the camera is able to 
search for pure evidence (in the sense of remotely sensing data), 
the human eye immediately confounds the visual impressions 
with imagination when it comes to “re-presencing”12 such relics. 
“Out of the darkness, like a ghostly apparition, the bow of a 
ship appears [...] just as it landed eighty-four years ago,” reads 
the screenplay of James Cameron’s Titanic, as the film director 
recollects his experience of the submarine search: “Initially [...] 
I was like the astronaut who experienced the moon as a series 
of checklists and mission protocols”—the true archaeological 
gaze. But “at a certain point I abandoned ‘the plan’ and allowed 
the emotional part of my mind to engage with the ship. It made all 
the difference in the world.”13 The gap between visual knowledge 
and historical imagination seeks to replace archaeological 
evidence by historicist reanimation, the navigation of data—
by hermeneutic empathy, just like sonar echoing in submarine 
archaeology becomes cultural resonance within humans. But 
let us not confuse data with imaginative vision. Sometimes 
the iconological, cultural, or historical knowledge of image 
contextualization can hinder an operative insight.
FOR A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MEDIA 
VISION FROM WITHIN TECHNOLOGY
Even if human visual impression is still the essential purpose 
of most image technologies, the actual events of optical signal 
transduction and digital signal processing remind us of a 
completely different inner-technological insight into what an 
“image” is (or does). Its specific configurations reveal a different 
kind of media phenomenology.
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Media archaeology looks at digital images not iconologically, 
but technologically. The “cold archaeological gaze” recognizes 
the digital image format as border-defined functions of data 
manipulation, once they have been sampled into the digital 
regime by analogue-to-digital conversion,14 or when they are 
born algorithmically. Images thus become calculable, rather than 
narratable.
Media archaeology addresses the technical aspects of the 
image, that is: “as medium.” But even the term “technical image” 
is actually misleading, since technology does not know images in 
the human sense. Let the image be rather defined mathematically, 
as “a real-valued function of two real variables.”15 Does the 
“image” therefore make sense (in its double meaning) only for 
human phenomenology, or is there something like an “alien” 
image phenomenon from the technical point of view?16 “The term 
‘picture’ suggests a flat object whose appearance varies from 
point to point.”17 This variation has been a perceptual function 
of human vision so far, but now returns from within technology, 
where a spatial distribution becomes radically temporalized.18 
Already with electronic television, it has been the human eye 
only which finally integrates the “flying spot” emanating from 
the cathode rays tube into an “image”—while “[a] machine can 
capture the same image, without any consciousness or experience 
of the visual form.”19 Is there something like the technologically 
“implicit image”?
While human-made, body-linked images, as cultural 
techniques, cannot be “liberated” from cultural semantics and 
(art) historical iconology,20 genuinely technically coded image 
actions “do not represent an object” any more (Questionnaire), 
“but rather are part of an operation” (Questionnaire). Such imaging 
is no longer primarily cultural iconology, but a truly technical 
iconology coming to its own, a “log-icon,”21 in Charles S. Peirce’s 
sense of diagrammatic iconicity.
“ZOOMIFICATION” OF THE SOCIAL IMAG(IN)ERY, 
AND “SOCIAL DISTANCING”
Technológos, while oscillating between the electrophysical 
real (matter) and the computational symbolical (programming), 
does not know any “imaginary” in the psychoanalytic sense. 
Images in computational (aka “new”) media are increasingly 
mediating “social” relations, replacing conventional face-to-
face communication in real presence by telecommunication 
via interfaces. But there is nothing “social” in so-called “social 
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media” any more, just communication in terms of engineering.22
“Much social interaction has been referred to the interfaces of 
different real-time communication technologies, to the point that 
the social field is now largely constituted by the production and 
distribution of images” (Questionnaire). At first glance, it looks 
as if the pandemic crisis has accelerated the impact of global 
image circulation by accelerating digital video conferencing 
formats like Zoom. But the “zoom” has become an opto-technical 
metaphor itself which lags behind the decisive transformation 
of indexical visual media against total datafic(a)tion. While 
only a material camera lens allows for a truly optical zoom, the 
digital zoom “adjusts the image in the camera itself [...], which 
is simply some in-camera image processing” which enlarges the 
image area at the center of the frame and trims away the outside 
edges.23 The camera itself has no sense of the “image” but only 
knows techno-mathematical image functions. The digital “image” 
technologizes the visual image. Shouldn’t the “visual” here be put 
in quotation marks, or rather the “image” itself?
In media-archaeological analysis, the former “social field” 
becomes a data matrix. A UK company Vivacity Labs company 
has installed a thousand of surveillance cameras across the 
country for the permanent registering of pedestrians, bikes, 
and cars. Once transcribed into data, such optical signals can 
be interpreted by an Artificial Intelligence algorithm, in order 
to predict and anticipate, for example, a traffic jam.24 All of 
a sudden, the Corona pandemic altered the function of this 
panoptical dispositive of dataveillance in favour of automatically 
controlling “social distancing,” by modifying the algorithm to 
measure the prescribed distance between passers-by. Thereby 
vivacity itself (literally) becomes a technical function—in direct 
analogy to the Corona-warning (or -tracing) apps in smartphones 
on the basis of Bluetooth distance metrics that does not capture 
images of humans any more, but simply the data of their mobile 
communication devices. Ironically, it is now the face masks 
(meant to hinder viral contagion) that hinder automated face 
recognition which has been the concern of privacy protection 
so far. It is only anonymous data which are thereby generated. 
“Discourse” becomes data traffic.
HUMAN IMAGE AESTHETICS VS.  
ICONO-LOGICAL IMAGE PROCESSING
A truly techno-logical ontology of the image takes place in 
computer graphics. The most radical media-archaeological 
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analysis is enacted by the machine itself, as an approach “that 
challenge[s] an anthropomorphic register” (Questionnaire). 
Most images in social media are still “indexically derived” 
(Questionnaire) and thereby referenced to the human lifeworld. 
Such digital imagery is nothing but a mere “extension of man” in 
McLuhan’s sense. The digital image comes to its own, and starts to 
develop its own ontology, only when it is “born” algorithmically.
“[T]he advent of operative images and machine vision” 
(Questionnaire) changes the “ontology” of the image (ibid.). In 
object-oriented ontology25 the image is granted a nonhuman 
existence. But the question how “we—as artists, theorists, critics, 
analysts, etc.—conceive of these changes in the ontology of 
the image” (Questionnaire) still limits the debate to the human 
cultural, or intellectual, sphere. The anthropocentric “we” affirms 
the focus on human aesthetics. The “image” stays bound to human 
culture as long as the analysis of such developments is restricted to 
human perception. But Walter Benjamin’s diagnosis of “profound 
changes in apperception” by photography, and cinematography, 
already assumes the point of view of the camera lens itself.26
How, then, are works of art in the age of nonhuman imagery 
to be analyzed? “Can they still be grasped within the established 
fields of visual culture” (Questionnaire), or by art-historical 
iconology (Erwin Panofsky)? The analysis of the “technical 
image”27 rather requires a media-scientific approach.28
TRANSCODING THE IMAGE ARCHIVE
The contemporary image-space is no longer defined by cultural 
semantics, visual discourse, and body-related cultural techniques 
like painting, but by “the very conditions of the work of art” 
(Questionnaire) and their archive (in Foucault’s definition29) 
change as they become grounded in nondiscursive technologies. 
“[...] the word ‘la arché’ in French [...] signifies the way in which 
discursive events have been registrated and can be extracted from 
the archive.”30 From a computational point of view, this is not an 
archival metaphor, but what the microprocessor does in visual 
processing is, in fact, assigning the image its storage locations 
and providing them with addresses. A radical media archaeology 
of technical images studies such non-discursive conditions of an 
emergent visual formation.
The image archive, as a visual memory institution, has had a 
rather passive agency so far, depending on humans to enact the 
iconological meanings of the visual records. But with their current 
digitalization and—more importantly—algorithmization, which 
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alters the conditioning principles of imaging, most conventional 
image collections become operative themselves, as assuming an 
active agency.
Even if the temptation is still there “[...] to replicate already 
known models like a database with standard field descriptors and 
an interface for public consultation mimicking the photo album,”31 
the alternative media-archaeological approach takes the digital 
scan at its face value. The digitization of an image is not simply 
a practical conversion from one format to another, but “changes 
the ontology of the archive itself. [...]. The DNA of a digital image 
is a matrix of pixels that can be manipulated mathematically and 
allows for a very different set of operations” (ibid.) when compared 
to the traditional iconological art-historical approach.
With the pervasiveness of operational images and machine 
vision, “more and more images seem to gain meaning and 
significance through their relationships with other images and 
from being networked [...]” (Questionnaire). Once an image has 
been digitized and therefore becomes addressable pixel by pixel, 
each of its elements can be linked, compared, and mapped upon 
elements in other images, resulting in a kind of alphabetization of 
image collections. Such hyperimages allow to navigate the image 
archive in unforeseen ways. Film works such as Eye / Machine 
(parts I-III, Germany 2001-2003) by Harun Farocki, who coined 
the term “operational image,”32 now themselves become subject 
to algorithmic experimentation in the archive.
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE “IMAGE OF MAN”
Let us finally return to the initial concern of the “Questionnaire.” 
Not only the exclusiveness of human “image” perception is 
displaced by the operative image, but the image of man as the 
author of images itself vanishes. In the notorious final remark of 
his Order of Things, Foucault predicts that the image of the human 
will disappear like the shape of a human face drawn into the sand 
at the sea shore.33 In times of highly integrated microcomputer 
chips, this sand is indeed silicon, which dissolves the image of 
man by “calculation”—literally “counting with calculi,” that is: 
with pebbles. The corporal image of man reappears on computer 
screens, but temporarily disappears in the actual medium channel. 
Foucault’s apocalyptic metaphor becomes micro-temporalized by 
actual computing, which is recording, transduction, processing, 
transmission and storage of man as “data face.” Such a machine 
imaging escapes human “vision” all together. All that remains, for 
humans, is to learn circuit diagrams, and to read code. 
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